Study on reputation incentive effect of environmental pollution control in scenic area Online publication date: Fri, 28-Feb-2014
by Huafeng Gao; Peiyu Ren; Jun Wang; Yuyan Luo; Wenqiang Tian
International Journal of Environment and Pollution (IJEP), Vol. 51, No. 3/4, 2013
Abstract: The information asymmetries between scenic area and tourists and between scenic area and tourism management department have made it more difficult to conduct pollution control in scenic area, and even made the scenic area to evade responsibilities of pollution control intentionally or unintentionally. On the basis of reputation model, this paper discusses the effective equilibrium conditions of reputation incentive mechanism under asymmetric information through analysing the generating process of reputation incentive effect during scenic area pollution control. And then based on the discussion, some policies to improve the initiative of pollution control in scenic area are suggested.
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