Theories of moral standing
by Nancy S. Hancock
Interdisciplinary Environmental Review (IER), Vol. 4, No. 2, 2002

Abstract: A being has moral standing when its interests must be given consideration in the deliberations of a moral agent. Three single-criterion theories of moral standing are surveyed and found to be inadequate for distinguishing between things that have moral standing and those that do not, as well as for establishing a method for weighing the comparable interests of beings with moral standing. One possible multi-criteria theory of moral standing is considered, and the implications for environmental policy decision-making is explored.

Online publication date: Mon, 13-May-2013

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