Outside director remuneration and the decision to grant CEO stock options
by Kiridaran Kanagaretnam, Robert Mathieu, Ramachandran Ramanan
International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics (IJBGE), Vol. 1, No. 2/3, 2004

Abstract: In this paper, we compare firm-specific attributes including outside director remuneration for two groups of firms. One of these groups consists of 96 firms that did not give stock options to the CEO during the sample period 1992–2001, while the other group of 571 firms granted stock options on a consistent basis during these years. Our results indicate that for the group with stock option grants, the remuneration to outside directors was significantly higher and the CEO had longer tenure compared to the other group. These results are robust even after controlling for other economic attributes associated with the decision to grant stock options.

Online publication date: Thu, 16-Sep-2004

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