Competition policy in periods of economic downturn
by Panagiotis N. Fotis
International Journal of Economics and Business Research (IJEBR), Vol. 4, No. 5, 2012

Abstract: This paper attempts to cast light on the main principles of the industrial restructuring agreements (crisis cartels) from a European perspective. For this purpose, I will explore the basic fundamentals of theory of harm concerning the formation of cartels during economic downturn in specific oligopolistic markets and I will analyse basic characteristics of past European cases. I also survey the Greek fish farming crisis cartel case.

Online publication date: Tue, 25-Nov-2014

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