Airport slot allocation in Europe: economic efficiency and fairness
by Lorenzo Castelli; Paola Pellegrini; Raffaele Pesenti
International Journal of Revenue Management (IJRM), Vol. 6, No. 1/2, 2012

Abstract: One of the main principles of the current airport slot allocation mechanism in Europe is based on the existence of historical (also called grandfather) rights granted to airlines for using such slots. Through an experimental analysis, we quantitatively show that the system disutility (i.e. the sum of the costs of the individual airlines due to the imbalance between demand and capacity at airports) is higher when grandfather rights (GFRs) are present. Moreover, we consider the interdependence of slots at different airports and we introduce the possibility to fairly redistribute such costs among airlines through monetary compensations. Our results suggest that it is possible to remove GFRs without significantly penalising airlines which own them.

Online publication date: Wed, 28-Dec-2011

The full text of this article is only available to individual subscribers or to users at subscribing institutions.

 
Existing subscribers:
Go to Inderscience Online Journals to access the Full Text of this article.

Pay per view:
If you are not a subscriber and you just want to read the full contents of this article, buy online access here.

Complimentary Subscribers, Editors or Members of the Editorial Board of the International Journal of Revenue Management (IJRM):
Login with your Inderscience username and password:

Username:        Password:          Forgotten your password?

Want to subscribe?
A subscription gives you complete access to all articles in the current issue, as well as to all articles in the previous three years (where applicable). See our Orders page to subscribe.

If you still need assistance, please email subs@inderscience.com