Simultaneous online auctions: decisions on reserve prices Online publication date: Thu, 30-Oct-2014
by Ming Zhou, Shu Zhou, Dayong Yang
International Journal of Information and Decision Sciences (IJIDS), Vol. 3, No. 2, 2011
Abstract: The simultaneous nature of online auctions changes the horizon a bidder faces. A seller then has to make strategic and/or operational changes in order to adapt. In this study, a three-stage game model is constructed to analyse seller reserve price setting decision in online auctions. The decision of whether a seller should set a reserve price is shown to be a function of the covariance (between expected seller profits and expected rivals) and the expected number of bidders, where the covariance term is jointly determined by possible actions of other sellers.
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