Corporate governance: beyond convergence? A comparative analysis in the wake of the global credit crunch Online publication date: Sun, 24-Jan-2010
by Helen Berry
Global Business and Economics Review (GBER), Vol. 11, No. 3/4, 2009
Abstract: The relative merits of shareholder versus stakeholder models of corporate governance have long been contested. Liberalisation and globalisation of financial markets resulted in the suggestion of potential convergence along shareholder principles. Research has attempted to justify the supremacy of one system over the other, however empirical evidence is weak. The culturally embedded nature of corporate governance within institutional frameworks suggests that transposition of single features may be inappropriate and may disrupt the overall efficiencies of a national system. The proportionality debate remains a key limiting factor in attempts at alignment. This paper will review the current state of the debate. It will employ comparative analysis to identify the path dependent evolution of corporate governance, contrasting differences within and between specific shareholder and stakeholder models. It will demonstrate alternative national responses to globalising pressures, to consider whether or not the contemporary situation can indeed, be regarded as one: beyond convergence?
Existing subscribers:
Go to Inderscience Online Journals to access the Full Text of this article.
If you are not a subscriber and you just want to read the full contents of this article, buy online access here.Complimentary Subscribers, Editors or Members of the Editorial Board of the Global Business and Economics Review (GBER):
Login with your Inderscience username and password:
Want to subscribe?
A subscription gives you complete access to all articles in the current issue, as well as to all articles in the previous three years (where applicable). See our Orders page to subscribe.
If you still need assistance, please email subs@inderscience.com
Our Blog 
Follow us on Twitter 
Visit us on Facebook