Corporate governance, relational banking and R&D: evidence from Japanese large firms in the 1980s and 1990s
by Hideaki Miyajima, Yasuhiro Arikawa, Atsushi Kato
International Journal of Technology Management (IJTM), Vol. 23, No. 7/8, 2002

Abstract: We investigate the effects of the Japanese corporate governance structure on corporate investments, especially R&D, dividing Japanese high R&D firms into two groups, i.e. young growing firms and old mature firms. The main bank relationship mitigates the asymmetric information problem for young growing firms. R&D expenditure in the 1990s. Portfolio investors strengthen the cash constraints on R&D, while stable shareholders offset the myopic pressure by portfolio investors. We also show some evidence that stable shareholders induced old mature firms to overinvest during the bubble economy period.

Online publication date: Thu, 10-Jul-2003

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