CEO pay, firm performance, and corporate governance in India's listed firms Online publication date: Sat, 28-Nov-2009
by Manju Jaiswall, Michael Firth
International Journal of Corporate Governance (IJCG), Vol. 1, No. 3, 2009
Abstract: In this study we examine the determinants of CEO compensation in large listed Indian companies. There is a positive relation between pay and a firm's performance. We find that remuneration committees are related to higher CEO compensation and there is no association between remuneration committees and pay-performance sensitivities. Thus, remuneration committees do not act in the way predicted by governance guidelines. CEOs in family firms are paid more. This suggests that CEOs use their power as a member of the controlling family to obtain higher compensation. The minority shareholders are therefore disadvantaged. CEOs in risky firms are paid less.
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