Global warming agreements: a practical approach to transferable credits
by Anthony Clunies-Ross
International Journal of Environment and Pollution (IJEP), Vol. 3, No. 1/2/3, 1993

Abstract: An international global warming agreement is likely to need international targets and sanctions to be effective. Such an agreement should be effective in achieving reductions and efficient in the way in which this is done. An absolute requirement, however, is that it be acceptable to all parties, so it must be seen as fair, tolerable as regards its obligations and sanctions and predictable to some degree in its impact. This paper considers how an international system of reward-penalty transfer payments for quotas to use hydrocarbons might be made to work. These quotas would be related to population and to existing use, with the weighting of these factors and the reward-penalty subject to politically agreed constraints.

Online publication date: Fri, 18-Sep-2009

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