Director categorisation and monitoring efficiency
by Samira Abi Dames; Bilal Al-Dah; Mustafa Dah
International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics (IJBGE), Vol. 17, No. 3, 2023

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of director co-option on the relationship between board structure and firm monitoring. Though non-co-opted independent directors enhance internal monitoring, co-opted independent directors seem to be the worst monitors. We do not observe a substantial difference in the monitoring functionality of co-opted and non-co-opted inside board members. Our paper suggests that co-opted independent directors are the main driving factor behind the converse association between co-opted boards and internal monitoring. We conclude that the efficiency of board monitoring should not be analysed solely based on director classification or director co-option, but rather a combination of both.

Online publication date: Wed, 05-Apr-2023

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