Decision making by Chinese managers in simulated conflict over welfare issues: responding to Other-Party's Strategy with moderation by hierarchy and past relationship
by Shan Ma
International Journal of Management and Decision Making (IJMDM), Vol. 8, No. 2/3/4, 2007

Abstract: As part of a larger research project, this study aims to examine the way people respond to Other-Party's Strategy during conflict processes. Three hundred and eighty-four Chinese managers participated in a simulation of conflict over welfare issues. The participants' behaviour during the simulation confirms that, in addition to the widely reported reciprocating behaviour, one party's strategy also tends to promote certain related strategies and suppress other strategies by another party. Furthermore, these responses to Other-Party's Strategy are moderated by existing hierarchical and interpersonal relationship between the conflicting parties.

Online publication date: Sat, 10-Mar-2007

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