Leniency regimes in BRICS nations: lessons for India Online publication date: Mon, 31-Jan-2022
by Narender Kumar
International Journal of Public Law and Policy (IJPLAP), Vol. 8, No. 1, 2022
Abstract: Hardcore cartels are considered the most egregious violation and a part of domestic competition law. It garbles world trade through concentration of economic power, and inefficiency which destroys the market due to its secret nature, and it is very difficult to detect its existence. Thus, nearly all competition regimes declare cartels as an illegal activity, and have different enforcement mechanisms including 'leniency programs'. It offers businesses the opportunity to come uncontaminated about their participation in cartel demeanour in exchange for immunity. This study attempts to trace the strength and scope of the leniency programmes in BRICS countries and to analyse the jurisprudence behind identifying parameters of its efficiency by comparing BRICS leniency regulations which reflects the weaknesses of the existing leniency programmes as deterrence in India and BRICS countries. The paper concludes by contributing an imminent path for possible perfection in the form of positive recommendations.
Existing subscribers:
Go to Inderscience Online Journals to access the Full Text of this article.
If you are not a subscriber and you just want to read the full contents of this article, buy online access here.Complimentary Subscribers, Editors or Members of the Editorial Board of the International Journal of Public Law and Policy (IJPLAP):
Login with your Inderscience username and password:
Want to subscribe?
A subscription gives you complete access to all articles in the current issue, as well as to all articles in the previous three years (where applicable). See our Orders page to subscribe.
If you still need assistance, please email subs@inderscience.com
Our Blog 
Follow us on Twitter 
Visit us on Facebook