Efficiency and administrative regulation: the case of electoral systems in Peru and Ecuador
by Rubén Méndez Reátegui; Raúl Alosilla Díaz; Oscar Súmar Albújar; Diego Coca Chanalata
International Journal of Public Law and Policy (IJPLAP), Vol. 8, No. 1, 2022

Abstract: Using an interdisciplinary analysis, this paper intends to describe the meanings and roles played by efficiency in public administration, from a legal-economic perspective. In line with the neo-institutional approach, legal-economic analysis is based on the premise that agents involved in the different levels of government make decisions according to the incentives they face, and so with legal rules. However, there are variables that impose costs and benefits, but can also cause externalities within the context of these decisions. We analyse how efficiency is applied in different contexts and administrative regulations, focusing on the electoral system.

Online publication date: Mon, 31-Jan-2022

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