Game analysis of food safety supervision and non-compliance in the food market of Chinese mainland
by Feixiong Ma; Yueqian Hu
International Journal of Decision Sciences, Risk and Management (IJDSRM), Vol. 10, No. 1/2, 2021

Abstract: Based on the game theory, this paper establishes the dynamic system of games between food market regulators and participants with incomplete information, and analyses the illegal production behaviours in the process of government supervision. Meanwhile, it discusses the evolution and stability of the system under different circumstances. The research shows that, under the condition of incomplete information, the participants will have opportunistic behaviours. Market participants (producers or sellers) continuously observe the regulator's results of investigation and punishment of past non-compliances, continuously revise the judge's judgment on their credibility, and speculate on how regulators will investigate and punish future non-compliances. Then there is a learning mechanism to make a decision on whether to violate the rules.

Online publication date: Mon, 13-Sep-2021

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