Judicial review of constitutional amendments: a legitimate defence of democracy through a counter-majoritarian power?
by Abel Arias-Castaño
International Journal of Human Rights and Constitutional Studies (IJHRCS), Vol. 8, No. 1/2, 2021

Abstract: This paper aims at addressing a subject that according to the arguments exposed therein, conforms a subtle constitutional paradox: the conceptual tensions in the democratic principle that arise with the creation of an instrument that is as necessary as it is problematic such as the judicial review of constitutional reforms by a counter-majoritarian body (i.e., the constitutional court). In view of the impossibility to address in a uniform and universal manner the potential compatibility between this type of control and the democratic principle, we propose a gradual or blurred approach to the question, taking into consideration how each constitutional system defines the limits of constitutional amendments.

Online publication date: Mon, 22-Mar-2021

The full text of this article is only available to individual subscribers or to users at subscribing institutions.

 
Existing subscribers:
Go to Inderscience Online Journals to access the Full Text of this article.

Pay per view:
If you are not a subscriber and you just want to read the full contents of this article, buy online access here.

Complimentary Subscribers, Editors or Members of the Editorial Board of the International Journal of Human Rights and Constitutional Studies (IJHRCS):
Login with your Inderscience username and password:

Username:        Password:          Forgotten your password?

Want to subscribe?
A subscription gives you complete access to all articles in the current issue, as well as to all articles in the previous three years (where applicable). See our Orders page to subscribe.

If you still need assistance, please email subs@inderscience.com