Related party transactions on tunnelling and propping perspective Online publication date: Tue, 23-Jun-2020
by Hety Budiyanti; Eduardus Tandelilin; Suad Husnan; Mamduh Hanafi
International Journal of Business and Globalisation (IJBG), Vol. 25, No. 1, 2020
Abstract: This research investigates the relationship between related party transactions (RPTs) and shareholders value. Using a sample of Indonesian listed firms from 2009 to 2015, we find that considerable shareholder value was destroyed when the RPT is considered as tunnelling activity, while on the other hand firms earn positive significant return when it is considered as propping activity. Our findings also suggest that firms with concentrated ownership structure experience larger value loss. Our further investigations also indicate the abnormal returns are positively related to proxies of corporate governance and information disclosure.
Existing subscribers:
Go to Inderscience Online Journals to access the Full Text of this article.
If you are not a subscriber and you just want to read the full contents of this article, buy online access here.Complimentary Subscribers, Editors or Members of the Editorial Board of the International Journal of Business and Globalisation (IJBG):
Login with your Inderscience username and password:
Want to subscribe?
A subscription gives you complete access to all articles in the current issue, as well as to all articles in the previous three years (where applicable). See our Orders page to subscribe.
If you still need assistance, please email subs@inderscience.com