Behaviour and rationality in corporate governance
DOI: 10.1504/IJBAF.2008.021027 | Oliver Marnet | The agency view of corporate governance requires effective monitors and gatekeepers to align the interests of the agent with those of the principal. One common denominator in recent corporate debacles appears to be the collective failure of... | 4 - 22 |
Auditor tenure, managerial fraud and report qualification: a behavioural game-theoretic approach
DOI: 10.1504/IJBAF.2008.021027 | Richard Fairchild | We consider the effect of auditor tenure on the level of managerial fraud and the extent of auditor qualification of reports. We consider two conflicting effects. As auditor tenure increases, the auditor|s ability to detect fraud increases ... | 23 - 37 |
Family business governance for ensuring a qualified management succession in a family business – how to cope with the increasing amount of management successions in German family businesses
DOI: 10.1504/IJBAF.2008.021027 | Marion A. Weissenberger-Eibl, Patrick Spieth | Family businesses are the fundamental basis of the German medium-sized enterprises. Business succession planning, i.e., transfer of management functions and ownership to one or more family members, gained a significant importance over the l... | 38 - 50 |
The effects of a long-term compensation plan on risky choices
DOI: 10.1504/IJBAF.2008.021027 | Stephen A. Butler | Long-term compensation plans have been suggested as means of providing incentives to the managers to maximise stockholders| welfare. There is no direct evidence that the existence of these plans will change the decision-making behaviour of ... | 51 - 66 |
Corporate social responsibility disclosure and corporate governance in Malaysia
DOI: 10.1504/IJBAF.2008.021027 | Ying Zhee Lim, Mohammad Talha, Junaini Mohamed, Abdullah Sallehhuddin | Using 743 Malaysian public listed companies, this study attempts to investigate the impact of corporate governance mechanism on corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure level and to examine the difference of CSR disclosure level in ... | 67 - 89 |
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