Coordinated decision making on inter-organisational knowledge innovation of project-based supply chain
by Guangdong Wu
International Journal of Manufacturing Technology and Management (IJMTM), Vol. 32, No. 2, 2018

Abstract: Considering the coordinated decision making on inter-organisational knowledge innovation of project-based supply chain, this paper analysed the coordinated decision making on knowledge innovation made between the owner and the contractor based on game theory under three scenarios: Nash non-cooperative game, Stackelberg game and coordination game. The results showed that under the coordination and cooperation model, both the effort level of the owner and the contractor and the total project value-adding are higher than those under non-cooperative condition. When reasonable allocation plan for residual project value-adding exists, the net profit of the owner and contractor is improved compared with that under non-cooperative game. This paper aims at providing a reliable decision and theoretical direction for project-based supply chain knowledge cooperation innovation, thus to achieve project value-adding.

Online publication date: Tue, 30-Jan-2018

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