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One-round key exchange in the standard model
by Colin Boyd, Yvonne Cliff, Juan M. Gonzalez Nieto, Kenneth G. Paterson
International Journal of Applied Cryptography (IJACT), Vol. 1, No. 3, 2009
Abstract: We consider one-round key exchange protocols secure in the standard model. The security analysis uses the powerful security model of Canetti and Krawczyk and a natural extension of it to the ID-based setting. It is shown how Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) can be used in a generic way to obtain two different protocol designs with progressively stronger security guarantees. A detailed analysis of the performance of the protocols is included; surprisingly, when instantiated with specific KEM constructions, the resulting protocols are competitive with the best previous schemes that have proofs only in the Random Oracle Model.
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