Service supply chain incentive strategy: from the perspective of win-win Online publication date:: Fri, 28-Feb-2020
by Weiping Zhu; Hongguang Yao
International Journal of Services Technology and Management (IJSTM), Vol. 26, No. 1, 2020
Abstract: Classical principal-agent model based on the hypothesis of decision-maker completely self-interest is the mainstream in classical economics; however, it reduces the stability of long-term cooperation and cannot reflect win-win cooperation. The paper introduces principal's value parameter reflecting win-win relation into incentive strategy, expands the traditional model, and establishes service supply chain dynamic incentive model from the perspective of win-win. In the new incentive strategy, the paper further considers implicit incentive and service provider's opportunism behaviour. Research shows that the value preference parameter can effectively coordinate the value relation between service integrator and service provider, motivate service provider to improve productive input and decrease opportunistic behaviour; implicit incentive has definite substitute effect on explicit incentive; under the joint effect of explicit and implicit incentives, service provider will keep higher productive input level, and its opportunistic input will be controlled effectively at the same time.
Online publication date:: Fri, 28-Feb-2020
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