Title: New signature schemes in the standard model based on publicly verifiable CCA-secure public key encryption

Authors: Haining Luo; Xu An Wang

Addresses: Key Laboratory of Information and Network Security Engineering, University of Chinese Armed Police Force, Sanqiao Town, Xi'an, Shaanxi Province, 710086, China ' Key Laboratory of Information and Network Security Engineering, University of Chinese Armed Police Force, Sanqiao Town, Xi'an, Shaanxi Province, 710086, China

Abstract: Till now, there are not many ways to construct signature schemes in the standard model and recently many researchers show great interest in construction secure signatures in the standard model. CCA secure publicly verifiable public key encryption in the standard model (PVPKE) is a new interesting primitive, in which the ciphertext's validity/integrity can be publicly verified. In this paper, we propose a new way to construct signature schemes in the standard model. That is, transforming CCA secure publicly verifiable public key encryption schemes into signature schemes. Our transformation based on the following facts: 1) the signature scheme and CCA secure publicly verifiable public key encryption scheme share the same 'publicly verifiability' property; 2) the signature scheme requires the signatures can not be malleable, and CCA secure publicly verifiable public key encryption also require the ciphertexts can not be malleable; 3) public key encryption and digital signature schemes can be viewed as dual of each other. By utilising these facts, we try to give a new way to construct signature scheme in the standard model.

Keywords: signature schemes; standard model; publicly verifiable; public key encryption; chosen ciphertext security; transformation; CCA secure; chosen ciphertext attack; cryptography; digital signatures.

DOI: 10.1504/IJICT.2015.068388

International Journal of Information and Communication Technology, 2015 Vol.7 No.2/3, pp.235 - 246

Received: 11 Sep 2013
Accepted: 10 Dec 2013

Published online: 01 Apr 2015 *

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