Title: A dynamic model of optimal reduction of marine oil pollution

Authors: Christophe Deissenberg, Hans Gottinger, Vladimir Gurman, Dmitry Marinushkin

Addresses: CEFI-CNRS. Chateau La Farge, Route des Milles, 13290 Les Milles, France. ' International Institute for Environmental Economics and Management (IIEEM), Schloss Waldsee, D 88339 Bad Waldsee, Germany. ' Program Systems Institute, RAS, 152140, Pereslavl-Zalessky, Russia. ' Pereslavl University, 152140, Pereslavl-Zalessky, Russia

Abstract: This paper proposes a system of dynamic models to describe the interactive behaviour of different agents (polluters, inspectors, and a principal pollution control agency) involved in the processes of marine oil pollution and of its prevention and purification, under some realistic assumptions. In particular, short- and long-term economic responses of polluters to monitoring efforts, as well as possible collusions between polluters and inspectors, are taken into account. A numerical example is considered using the results of Deissenberg et al., (2001a), which show the existence of optimal fines and inspector wage rates that minimise (along with other variables) a simple and visual ||social damage|| criterion.

Keywords: optimisation; protection cost; shadow relations; social damage; environmental pollution; marine pollution; oil pollution; oil spills.

DOI: 10.1504/IJEP.2001.005192

International Journal of Environment and Pollution, 2001 Vol.15 No.3, pp.322 - 332

Published online: 09 Sep 2004 *

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