Title: Do family firms use more or less debt?

Authors: Imen Latrous; Samir Trabelsi

Addresses: University of Quebec at Chicoutimi, 555 Bd University, G7H 2B1, Chicoutimi, Canada ' Brock University, 500 Glenridge Ave., St. Catharines L2S 3A1, Canada

Abstract: This paper investigates whether the identity of controlling shareholders influences the financing decision of the firm. In particular, we explore the impact of family control on firm debt levels. We also study the effect of family involvement in management on firm leverage. Using a sample of firms listed on the French stock market, our results show that family firms use less debt than non-family firms. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that family-controlled-shareholders prefer less debt as a mean to reduce firm risk. Furthermore, our results show that family firms that have a family member as CEO use more debt than family firms with outside CEOs.

Keywords: family firms; debt leverage; controlling shareholders; incentive effect; entrenchment effect; financing decisions; family control; debt levels; France; firm risk; risk management.

DOI: 10.1504/IJCG.2012.051861

International Journal of Corporate Governance, 2012 Vol.3 No.2/3/4, pp.182 - 209

Published online: 10 Apr 2015 *

Full-text access for editors Full-text access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article