Title: Rational secret sharing with semi-rational players

Authors: Yilei Wang; Hao Wang; Qiuliang Xu

Addresses: School of Computer Science and Technology, Shandong University, Jinan 250101, China; School of Information Science and Engineering, Ludong University, Yantai 264025, China. ' School of Computer Science and Technology, Shandong University, Jinan 250101, China. ' School of Computer Science and Technology, Shandong University, Jinan 250101, China

Abstract: Rational secret sharing, first introduced by Halpern and Teague, means that whether players send their shares relies on their utilities, whereas in traditional scheme, players are assumed to contribute their shares willingly. This paper puts forward a rational secret-sharing scheme where players run their reconstruction protocol in point-to-point communication networks other than broadcast channels which are often used in previous papers. Kol and Naor propose an efficient t-out-of-n protocol for rational secret sharing without using cryptographic primitives while it has weak robustness to coalition when short player colludes with any long players. The protocol proposed by Fuchsbauer and Katz runs efficiently in asynchronous or point-to-point networks. Although it achieves strict Nash equilibrium and is stable with respect to trembles, it is susceptible to realise fairness among the whole party. This paper proposes a rational secret-sharing scheme in point-to-point communication networks to achieve fairness and robustness to coalition.

Keywords: game theory; Nash equilibrium; rational secret sharing; point-to-point networks.

DOI: 10.1504/IJGUC.2012.045697

International Journal of Grid and Utility Computing, 2012 Vol.3 No.1, pp.59 - 67

Received: 19 Sep 2011
Accepted: 21 Sep 2011
Published online: 20 Dec 2014 *

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