Title: French banks, governance, and specific investments

Authors: Anis Jarboui, Hamadi Fakhfakh

Addresses: High School of Business Administration ISAAS, Faculty of Economics and Management FSEGS, Sfax University, ISAAS, BP 1013, Sfax, Tunisia. ' High School of Business Administration ISAAS, Faculty of Economics and Management FSEGS, Sfax University, ISAAS, BP 1013, Sfax, Tunisia

Abstract: This paper analyses the impact of French banks on the adoption of specific investment in French companies through board representation and ownership stakes. The theoretical principles suggest that the banks refuse the financing of this type of investment. Therefore, the level of banking debt has a negative effect on the specific investment. Our hypotheses suggest that this effect changes according to the contribution of bankers in the corporate governance system. The results carried out on a sample including 176 French listed firms show a change in the behaviour of banks following a real implication in the corporate governance system.

Keywords: debt; French banks; corporate governance; specific investment; high technology; low technology; France; board representation; ownership stakes.

DOI: 10.1504/IJMEF.2008.021144

International Journal of Monetary Economics and Finance, 2008 Vol.1 No.4, pp.338 - 354

Published online: 06 Nov 2008 *

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