Title: A challenge-based countermeasure against the spoofed PS-Poll-based DoS attack in IEEE 802.11 networks

Authors: Hocine Souilah; Abderrahmane Baadache; Louiza Bouallouche-Medjkoune

Addresses: Research Unit LaMOS, Faculty of Exact Sciences, University of Bejaia, 06000 Bejaia, Algeria ' Research Unit LaMOS, Faculty of Exact Sciences, University of Bejaia, 06000 Bejaia, Algeria; Mathematics and Computer Science Department, University of Algiers 1, 16000 Algiers, Algeria ' Research Unit LaMOS, Faculty of Exact Sciences, University of Bejaia, 06000 Bejaia, Algeria

Abstract: 802.11 network is an emerging wireless broadband technology used to connect client stations to the network via an access point (AP). This network is particularly vulnerable to denial of service (DoS) attacks targeting the network availability. In this paper, we focus on the spoofed PS-Poll-based DoS attack in 802.11 power save mode (PSM), where the attacker spoofs the polling frame on behalf of the client in order to destruct data buffered at the AP, that are expected to be delivered to asleep client. To cope with this attack, we rely on the prime factorisation to authenticate PS-Poll frame needed to retrieve buffered data. The countermeasure we propose, called authenticated power save poll (APSP), is both detective and preventive one with low communication, computing and storage overheads. It can be integrated in 802.11 standard through firmware upgrade without any required additional hardware. In order to prove the efficiency of the proposed countermeasure and evaluate its performance, extensive experiments are carried out. Simulation results show that the spoofed PS-Poll-based DoS attack is successfully prevented and detected by APSP compared to the basic 802.11 PSM.

Keywords: IEEE 802.11; power save mode; PSM; PS-Poll; DoS attack; prime factorisation.

DOI: 10.1504/IJCCBS.2019.104489

International Journal of Critical Computer-Based Systems, 2019 Vol.9 No.3, pp.193 - 214

Accepted: 12 May 2019
Published online: 14 Jan 2020 *

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