Title: Countermeasures for timing-based side-channel attacks against shared, modern computing hardware

Authors: Reza Montasari; Richard Hill; Amin Hosseinian-Far; Farshad Montaseri

Addresses: Department of Computer Science, The University of Huddersfield, Queensgate, Huddersfield, HD1 3DH, UK ' Department of Computer Science, The University of Huddersfield, Queensgate, Huddersfield, HD1 3DH, UK ' Department of Business Systems and Operations, University of Northampton, Park Campus, Boughton Green Road, Northampton, NN2 7AL, UK ' Islamic Azad University of Khark, Science and Research Branch, Bushehr Province, Khark Island, Iran

Abstract: There are several vulnerabilities in computing systems hardware that can be exploited by attackers to carry out devastating microarchitectural timing-based side-channel attacks against these systems and as a result compromise the security of the users of such systems. By exploiting microarchitectural resources, adversaries can potentially launch different variants of timing attacks, for instance, to leak sensitive information through timing. In view of these security threats against computing hardware, in a recent study, titled 'Are timing-based side-channel attacks feasible in shared, modern computing hardware?', currently undergoing the review process, we presented and analysed several such attacks. This extended study proceeds to build upon our recent study in question. To this end, we analyse the existing countermeasures against timing attacks and propose new strategies in dealing with such attacks.

Keywords: side channels; timing attacks; hardware attacks; channel attacks; digital investigations; countermeasures.

DOI: 10.1504/IJESDF.2019.100480

International Journal of Electronic Security and Digital Forensics, 2019 Vol.11 No.3, pp.294 - 320

Received: 16 Apr 2018
Accepted: 20 May 2018
Published online: 29 Jun 2019 *

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