The relationship between CEO performance-based compensation and shareholders value creation: a cross national analysis Online publication date: Thu, 19-May-2016
by Habib Jouber
International Journal of Managerial and Financial Accounting (IJMFA), Vol. 8, No. 1, 2016
Abstract: The objective of the paper is to develop deeper insight into how the firm's incentive systems are designed and, whether the CEOs compensation pay-to-performance schemes really align the incentives of executives and shareholders. Logit and Stepwise regressions on executive compensation data over 2004-2008 of 231 listed companies' belongings to four countries from the Anglo-American and the Euro-continental corporate governance models show that pay-to-performance incentives serve likely shareholders as they tend to create value. Moreover, sensitivity analyses point out that their effects on the long term total shareholder return are far from unanimous. They often depend on the context in which they are planned and executed. More specifically, they are even large than the property rights are stripped, the institutional ownership is less restricted, the governance quality is better, the investor protection is high, and the legal system is common law one.
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