Hostile takeovers in China: comparative corporate governance and institutional changes
by Lin Zhang
International Journal of Private Law (IJPL), Vol. 6, No. 4, 2013

Abstract: Hostile takeovers are yet to be a common practice for Chinese listed companies. As empirical evidence shows, the existence of hostile takeovers, which is an external governance mechanism, is vital for the remedy of the inefficient conglomerate strategy of Chinese listed companies. Along with the end of equity-division reform, the media has started to pay attention to the emergence of hostile takeovers in China. Through exploring the changes of ownership concentration of Chinese listed companies, it is concluded that hostile takeovers will be likely to spring up in the not-so-far future in China. However, in order to turn the emergence of hostile takeovers from a possibility to a reality and further to achieve their implications for the corporate governance of Chinese listed companies, Chinese legislators must impose limitations on the application of pre-tender-offer anti-takeover measures.

Online publication date: Fri, 29-Nov-2013

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