CLEC access charges and the problem of monopoly power Online publication date: Wed, 13-Aug-2003
by Noel D. Uri
International Journal of Services Technology and Management (IJSTM), Vol. 3, No. 3, 2002
Abstract: The analysis in this paper looks at the problem of excessive originating and terminating access charges imposed by some CLECs in the USA. The problem arises because the current institutional structure provides an incentive for CLECs to charge for access service in excess of what a competitive market would indicate. An examination of the data shows that the problem of excessive access charges imposed by CLECs is very real. An analysis of terminating access charges for September 2000 reveals that average terminating access charges billed to three IXCs are excessive, exceeding average price cap regulated ILEC access charges by 370% to 470%. A couple of solutions to the problem are offered including a first-best solution whereby the calling party would be required to pay for the originating access service and have the receiving party pay for terminating access service. A second-best solution would be to limit a CLEC's access charges to an IXC to be less than or equal to the access charges of the ILEC with which it directly competes for customers.
Existing subscribers:
Go to Inderscience Online Journals to access the Full Text of this article.
If you are not a subscriber and you just want to read the full contents of this article, buy online access here.Complimentary Subscribers, Editors or Members of the Editorial Board of the International Journal of Services Technology and Management (IJSTM):
Login with your Inderscience username and password:
Want to subscribe?
A subscription gives you complete access to all articles in the current issue, as well as to all articles in the previous three years (where applicable). See our Orders page to subscribe.
If you still need assistance, please email subs@inderscience.com
Our Blog 
Follow us on Twitter 
Visit us on Facebook