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<title>Most recent issue published online for the International Journal of Private Law.</title>
<description>International Journal of Private Law</description>
<link>http://www.inderscience.com/browse/index.php?journalID=250&amp;year=2012&amp;vol=5&amp;issue=1</link>
<dc:publisher>Inderscience Publishers Ltd</dc:publisher>
<dc:language>en-uk</dc:language>
<prism:publicationName>International Journal of Private Law</prism:publicationName>
<prism:issn>1753-6235</prism:issn>
<prism:eIssn>1753-6243</prism:eIssn>
<prism:copyright>&#169; 2012 Inderscience Publishers Ltd</prism:copyright>
<prism:rightsAgent>editor@inderscience.com</prism:rightsAgent>
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<title>International Journal of Private Law</title>
<url>https://www.inderscience.com/images/files/coverImgs/ijpl_scoverijpl.jpg</url>
<link>http://www.inderscience.com/browse/index.php?journalID=250&amp;year=2012&amp;vol=5&amp;issue=1</link>
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<item rdf:about="http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJPL.2012.043898">
<title>Bad eggs and oil slicks&#58; a defendant&#39;s wealth is an important factor in properly assessing punitive damages</title>
<link>http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=43898</link>
<description>Had British Petroleum Oil known that courts in the USA would likely award punitive damages that would seriously harm BP&#39;s financial position, perhaps BP would have taken the necessary steps to prevent the latest disaster. Instead, big companies like BP have no fear of big damages due to the Supreme Court&#39;s guidelines that connect punitive damages to compensatory damages rather than to punishment and deterrence. Yet, punishment and deterrence are the reasons why punitive damages exist. This article looks back 20 years to examine how the US Supreme Court addressed issues related to assessing punitive damage amounts. Next, the article examines the implications of the Supreme Court&#39;s decisions. The article then presents examples of current lower court decisions impacted by the Supreme Court. After analysing the most influential factor currently used to assign punitive damages and the ratio of compensatory to punitive damages, the article proposes an adjustment of the guidelines to factor in a defendant&#39;s wealth when assigning damages so that courts serve the purpose of punishment and deterrence.</description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=43898"><b>Bad eggs and oil slicks&#58; a defendant&#39;s wealth is an important factor in properly assessing punitive damages</b></A><br />Judy Feuer Zimet<br /><i>International Journal of Private Law, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2012) pp. 1 - 21</i><br />Had British Petroleum Oil known that courts in the USA would likely award punitive damages that would seriously harm BP&#39;s financial position, perhaps BP would have taken the necessary steps to prevent the latest disaster. Instead, big companies like BP have no fear of big damages due to the Supreme Court&#39;s guidelines that connect punitive damages to compensatory damages rather than to punishment and deterrence. Yet, punishment and deterrence are the reasons why punitive damages exist. This article looks back 20 years to examine how the US Supreme Court addressed issues related to assessing punitive damage amounts. Next, the article examines the implications of the Supreme Court&#39;s decisions. The article then presents examples of current lower court decisions impacted by the Supreme Court. After analysing the most influential factor currently used to assign punitive damages and the ratio of compensatory to punitive damages, the article proposes an adjustment of the guidelines to factor in a defendant&#39;s wealth when assigning damages so that courts serve the purpose of punishment and deterrence.</p>]]></content:encoded>
<dc:identifier>10.1504/IJPL.2012.043898</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>International Journal of Private Law, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2012) pp. 1 - 21</dc:source>
<dc:creator>Judy Feuer Zimet</dc:creator>
<dc:contributor>Phoenix School of Law, 15221 N. Clubgate Dr. #2136 Scottsdale, AZ 85254, USA</dc:contributor>
<dc:subject>punitive damages</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>compensatory damages</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>punishment</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>deterrence</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>wealth</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>single&#45;digit ratios</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Supreme Court guidelines</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>oil slicks</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>defendants</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>BP</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>British Petroleum</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>USA</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>United States</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>disasters</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>lower courts</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>legal decisions</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>damage ratios</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>BMW</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Ira Gore</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>motor vehicles</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>North America</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>salmonella</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Iowa</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Jack DeCoster</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Wright County Egg</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>farms</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>farming</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>eggs</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>factoring</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Gore guideposts</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>private law.</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2011-11-29T23:20:50-05:00</dc:date>
<prism:volume>5</prism:volume>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:startingPage>1</prism:startingPage>
<prism:endingPage>21</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2011-11-29T23:20:50-05:00</prism:publicationDate>
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<item rdf:about="http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJPL.2012.043899">
<title>Non&#45;state law in party autonomy   a European perspective</title>
<link>http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=43899</link>
<description>Non&#45;state law refers to rules that do not belong to any sovereign state. Regardless of the increasing importance of non&#45;state law in international transactions, the application of non&#45;state law in court proceedings has not been clarified. In European Union, although the European Commission proposed that contractual parties should be allowed to choose &#39;principles and rules of the substantive law of contract recognised internationally or in the community&#39;, this proposal is not admitted in the final Rome I Regulation. This article considers the European development, discusses whether non&#45;state law should be allowed as the governing law to a cross&#45;border contract upon the parties&#39; authorisation and provides suggestions for the appropriate treatment of non&#45;state law in private international law.</description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=43899"><b>Non&#45;state law in party autonomy   a European perspective</b></A><br />Zheng Sophia Tang<br /><i>International Journal of Private Law, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2012) pp. 22 - 39</i><br />Non&#45;state law refers to rules that do not belong to any sovereign state. Regardless of the increasing importance of non&#45;state law in international transactions, the application of non&#45;state law in court proceedings has not been clarified. In European Union, although the European Commission proposed that contractual parties should be allowed to choose &#39;principles and rules of the substantive law of contract recognised internationally or in the community&#39;, this proposal is not admitted in the final Rome I Regulation. This article considers the European development, discusses whether non&#45;state law should be allowed as the governing law to a cross&#45;border contract upon the parties&#39; authorisation and provides suggestions for the appropriate treatment of non&#45;state law in private international law.</p>]]></content:encoded>
<dc:identifier>10.1504/IJPL.2012.043899</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>International Journal of Private Law, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2012) pp. 22 - 39</dc:source>
<dc:creator>Zheng Sophia Tang</dc:creator>
<dc:contributor>School of Law, University of Aberdeen, Taylor Building, Aberdeen, AB24 3UB, Scotland, UK</dc:contributor>
<dc:subject>non&#45;state laws</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>party autonomy</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>commercial contracts</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>legal rules</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>sovereign states</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>international transactions</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>court proceedings</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>European Union</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>EU</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>European Commission</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>contractual parties</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>legal principles</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>substantive laws</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Rome I Regulation</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>EC Regulations</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>European Parliament</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>European Council</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>contractual obligations</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>governing laws</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>cross&#45;border contracts</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>party authorisation</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>international law</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>private law.</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2011-11-29T23:20:50-05:00</dc:date>
<prism:volume>5</prism:volume>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:startingPage>22</prism:startingPage>
<prism:endingPage>39</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2011-11-29T23:20:50-05:00</prism:publicationDate>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJPL.2012.043900">
<title>Accommodating employees with mental impairments&#58; an empirical study of employer practices</title>
<link>http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=43900</link>
<description>This paper discusses ADA workplace accommodations, particularly those for individuals with mental impairments, from the perspective of employers. Respondents from 14 companies were asked to describe the firm&#39;s accommodation process in response to hypothetical scenarios involving possible physical and mental disability issues in the workplace. Their responses were driven more by company culture, nature of the job and work environment, and the employee&#39;s work history than by a desire to comply with legal mandates. Moreover, accommodations were frequently granted without regard to whether individuals met the legal definition of &#39;disabled&#39; under the recently amended ADA. In other words, most firms were at or &#39;ahead&#39; of what the law required, without being motivated by the law itself or fears of litigation. This research also supports and expands prior findings that small employers utilise an informal process to assess and grant accommodations; in this research, employers of varying sizes tended to use an informal process if disability benefits or Family Medical Leave Act &#40;FMLA&#41; protection were not being sought.</description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=43900"><b>Accommodating employees with mental impairments&#58; an empirical study of employer practices</b></A><br />Karen Patterson<br /><i>International Journal of Private Law, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2012) pp. 40 - 60</i><br />This paper discusses ADA workplace accommodations, particularly those for individuals with mental impairments, from the perspective of employers. Respondents from 14 companies were asked to describe the firm&#39;s accommodation process in response to hypothetical scenarios involving possible physical and mental disability issues in the workplace. Their responses were driven more by company culture, nature of the job and work environment, and the employee&#39;s work history than by a desire to comply with legal mandates. Moreover, accommodations were frequently granted without regard to whether individuals met the legal definition of &#39;disabled&#39; under the recently amended ADA. In other words, most firms were at or &#39;ahead&#39; of what the law required, without being motivated by the law itself or fears of litigation. This research also supports and expands prior findings that small employers utilise an informal process to assess and grant accommodations; in this research, employers of varying sizes tended to use an informal process if disability benefits or Family Medical Leave Act &#40;FMLA&#41; protection were not being sought.</p>]]></content:encoded>
<dc:identifier>10.1504/IJPL.2012.043900</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>International Journal of Private Law, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2012) pp. 40 - 60</dc:source>
<dc:creator>Karen Patterson</dc:creator>
<dc:contributor>University of Connecticut School of Law, 45 Elizabeth Street, Hartford, CT 06105, USA</dc:contributor>
<dc:subject>Americans with Disabilities Act</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>ADA</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>employees</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Family Medical Leave Act</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>FMLA</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>disability issues</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>workplaces</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>statutes</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>laws</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>USA</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>United States</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>mental impairments</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>employer practices</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>workplace accommodations</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>accommodation processes</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>physical disabilities</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>mental disabilities</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>company cultures</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>work environments</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>work history</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>legal mandates</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>legal definitions</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>disabled people</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>litigation</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>small and medium&#45;sized enterprises</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>SMEs</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>informal processes</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>legal protection</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Greater Hartford</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Connecticut</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>private law.</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2011-11-29T23:20:50-05:00</dc:date>
<prism:volume>5</prism:volume>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:startingPage>40</prism:startingPage>
<prism:endingPage>60</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2011-11-29T23:20:50-05:00</prism:publicationDate>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJPL.2012.043901">
<title>The protection of a celebrity parody&#58; Paris Hilton v. Hallmark Cards</title>
<link>http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=43901</link>
<description>This article focuses on the Hilton v. Hallmark decision issued by the 9th Circuit in 2009. Ultimately, the article criticises the &#39;transformative use&#39; standard articulated by the California Supreme Court for evaluating right of publicity claims. Additionally, the article advocates for a more consistent standard which adequately balances celebrity interests with First Amendment free speech rights.</description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=43901"><b>The protection of a celebrity parody&#58; Paris Hilton v. Hallmark Cards</b></A><br />Erica Klazmer<br /><i>International Journal of Private Law, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2012) pp. 61 - 78</i><br />This article focuses on the Hilton v. Hallmark decision issued by the 9th Circuit in 2009. Ultimately, the article criticises the &#39;transformative use&#39; standard articulated by the California Supreme Court for evaluating right of publicity claims. Additionally, the article advocates for a more consistent standard which adequately balances celebrity interests with First Amendment free speech rights.</p>]]></content:encoded>
<dc:identifier>10.1504/IJPL.2012.043901</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>International Journal of Private Law, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2012) pp. 61 - 78</dc:source>
<dc:creator>Erica Klazmer</dc:creator>
<dc:contributor>Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, 55 5th Ave., New York, NY 10003, USA</dc:contributor>
<dc:subject>right of publicity</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>transformative use</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>parodies</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>fair use</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>First Amendment</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>United States Constitution</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>USA</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Bill of Rights</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>constitutional freedoms</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>free speech</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>celebrity parody</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Paris Hilton</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Hallmark Cards</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>legal protection</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>legal decisions</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>California Supreme Court</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>consistent standards</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>birthday cards</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>greetings cards</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>celebrity interests</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>celebrities</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>private law.</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2011-11-29T23:20:50-05:00</dc:date>
<prism:volume>5</prism:volume>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:startingPage>61</prism:startingPage>
<prism:endingPage>78</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2011-11-29T23:20:50-05:00</prism:publicationDate>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJPL.2012.043902">
<title>Land reform and investment protection after the Campbell litigation&#58; can SADC learn from NAFTA&#63;</title>
<link>http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=43902</link>
<description>In 2008, Mike Campbell and other former commercial farmers took the Zimbabwean Government to the erstwhile SADC Tribunal in Windhoek over a land dispute. While the dispute was primarily about allegedly discriminatory land reform laws and policies affecting citizens of Zimbabwe mainly, the manner in which the Zimbabwean Government reacted to the ruling suddenly raises questions about the protection of investments in the SADC region. The nagging question which this paper seeks to address is, &#34;is the SADC dispute settlement regime as currently provided for in Article 32 of the Declaration and Treaty of SADC and the subsequent Protocol on Trade adequate to guarantee investor protection in light of the aftermath of the Campbell decision&#63;&#34; In an attempt to address the question, this paper takes a closer look at the NAFTA Chapter 11 Investment protection provisions and compares them with their SADC counterparts.</description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=43902"><b>Land reform and investment protection after the Campbell litigation&#58; can SADC learn from NAFTA&#63;</b></A><br />Lonias Ndlovu<br /><i>International Journal of Private Law, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2012) pp. 79 - 100</i><br />In 2008, Mike Campbell and other former commercial farmers took the Zimbabwean Government to the erstwhile SADC Tribunal in Windhoek over a land dispute. While the dispute was primarily about allegedly discriminatory land reform laws and policies affecting citizens of Zimbabwe mainly, the manner in which the Zimbabwean Government reacted to the ruling suddenly raises questions about the protection of investments in the SADC region. The nagging question which this paper seeks to address is, &#34;is the SADC dispute settlement regime as currently provided for in Article 32 of the Declaration and Treaty of SADC and the subsequent Protocol on Trade adequate to guarantee investor protection in light of the aftermath of the Campbell decision&#63;&#34; In an attempt to address the question, this paper takes a closer look at the NAFTA Chapter 11 Investment protection provisions and compares them with their SADC counterparts.</p>]]></content:encoded>
<dc:identifier>10.1504/IJPL.2012.043902</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>International Journal of Private Law, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2012) pp. 79 - 100</dc:source>
<dc:creator>Lonias Ndlovu</dc:creator>
<dc:contributor>Department of Private Law, University of Zululand, South Africa</dc:contributor>
<dc:subject>Southern African Development Community</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>SADC</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>NAFTA</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>North American Free Trade Agreement</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Zimbabwe</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>protocols</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Mike Campbell</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>land reforms</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>investment protection</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>litigation</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>commercial farmers</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>farming</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>farms</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>tribunals</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Windhoek</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>land disputes</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Namibia</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>discriminatory laws</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Africa</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>governments</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>discriminatory policies</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>legal rulings</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>dispute settlement</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>declarations</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>treaties</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>private law.</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2011-11-29T23:20:50-05:00</dc:date>
<prism:volume>5</prism:volume>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:startingPage>79</prism:startingPage>
<prism:endingPage>100</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2011-11-29T23:20:50-05:00</prism:publicationDate>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJPL.2012.043903">
<title>Reform of the marriage law in Argentina</title>
<link>http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=43903</link>
<description>The reform of marriage law in Argentina including same&#45;sex couples brought a great deal of equality to the system but it has some elements inconsistent with other aspects of Family Law that remain unmodified. The modification of the marriage regime addressed the issues related to the equality principle and solidarity as the aim of the law. This article argues that the reform is not in full harmony with the Argentine legal system.</description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=43903"><b>Reform of the marriage law in Argentina</b></A><br />Alejandro Laje<br /><i>International Journal of Private Law, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2012) pp. 101 - 106</i><br />The reform of marriage law in Argentina including same&#45;sex couples brought a great deal of equality to the system but it has some elements inconsistent with other aspects of Family Law that remain unmodified. The modification of the marriage regime addressed the issues related to the equality principle and solidarity as the aim of the law. This article argues that the reform is not in full harmony with the Argentine legal system.</p>]]></content:encoded>
<dc:identifier>10.1504/IJPL.2012.043903</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>International Journal of Private Law, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2012) pp. 101 - 106</dc:source>
<dc:creator>Alejandro Laje</dc:creator>
<dc:contributor>Universidad Abierta Interamericana Law School, Chacabuco 90 &#40;C1069AAB&#41;, Buenos Aires, Argentina</dc:contributor>
<dc:subject>marriage laws</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>law reforms</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Argentina</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>same&#45;sex couples</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>legal equality</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>family law</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>inconsistency</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>regime modification</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>marriage regimes</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>legal systems</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>solidarity principles</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>legal rules</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>private law.</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2011-11-29T23:20:50-05:00</dc:date>
<prism:volume>5</prism:volume>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:startingPage>101</prism:startingPage>
<prism:endingPage>106</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2011-11-29T23:20:50-05:00</prism:publicationDate>
</item>
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